Despite a strong interest in entrepreneurship, economists have devoted little attention to the role of health insurance availability. I investigate the impact of a unique policy experiment-New Jersey's Individual Health Coverage Plan-on self-employment. Implemented in August 1993, the IHCP included an extensive set of reforms that loosened the historical connection between traditional employment and health insurance by facilitating access to coverage that was not employer-linked. I find evidence that the IHCP increased self-employment among New Jersey residents, relative to various sets of comparison states. Consistent with key policy features, including pure community rating of premiums, I find larger behavioral responses for unmarried, older, and observably less-healthy individuals.
INTRODUCTION
While abundant evidence suggests the availability of health insurance influences labor market choices like the timing of retirement, there is much less research regarding its impact on self-employment decisions. In this paper, I investigate the impact of New Jersey's Individual Health Coverage Plan (IHCP) on the self-employment of its residents. The IHCP, which was implemented in August 1993, included an extensive set of reforms intended to encourage access to individual health insurance, while promoting competition in the nongroup market. Chief among these reforms, the IHCP guaranteed the availability and renewability of health insurance purchased in the individual market, while imposing pure community rating on premiums. The legislation loosened the historical connection between traditional employment and health insurance in the United States by facilitating access to a potential source of coverage that was not employer-linked. More generally, the IHCP provides an opportunity to examine the impact of social insurance on economic risk-taking like entrepreneurship.
Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) from 1991 to 1996, I find evidence that the IHCP increased the fraction of New Jersey residents who reported being self-employed, relative to various sets of comparison states that did not substantially reform their individual health insurance markets over this period. Importantly, I also allow the impact of the IHCP on self-employment to vary by the degree to which it relaxed the link between traditional employment and health insurance. For example, given that the IHCP guaranteed health insurance availability and renewability in the context of pure communityrating of premiums, one may expect larger behavioral responses from observably less-healthy 2 individuals on the assumption that they would otherwise have had more difficulty obtaining health insurance in the individual market. To test this possibility, I allow the impact of the IHCP on self-employment to vary by smoking status, weight-related health, and age. Consistent with expectations, I find evidence of stronger relationships for smokers, the clinically obese, and older individuals. In addition, I allow the impact of IHCP to vary by marital status and find estimated effects that are much larger for unmarried individuals who generally do not have an existing source of alternative health insurance coverage via a spouse. That is, I find larger implied effects for a group that, in principle, experienced a greater loosening of the link between health insurance and traditional employment as a result of the IHCP.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section provides a brief background on why health insurance availability might affect labor market choices and motivates why the IHCP in particular may have affected the self-employment decisions of New Jersey residents. The third section describes my data, focusing on key variables and my analysis sample. Though not a traditional source of employment-related information, the fraction reporting self-employment in the BRFSS closely matches the level reported in the Current Population Surveys (CPS), a more commonly used source of such information. The fourth section presents my empirical strategy, which involves before and after comparisons in the context of a difference-in-differences framework. As alluded to above, I employ various sets of comparison states that implemented no substantial health insurance reforms over the period in question. In particular, I first compare New Jersey to nearby Pennsylvania and then sequentially expand the relevant comparison group to include the mid-Atlantic, the Northeast, and all U.S. states that did not enact major health insurance reforms in the relevant period. A key part of my empirical strategy is that I exploit within-state control groups, defined by health and marital statuses, on the assumption that the IHCP should have differential impacts on the self-employment decisions of these groups. This assumption is supported by evidence and intuition which suggest these groups are more likely to experience health insurance-related job-lock. In essence, I examine the degree to which the IHCP, as a source of alternative coverage, "unlocked" health insurance-induced attachment to traditional employment. The fifth section presents my findings, which fill a gap in the literature that relates health insurance availability and labor market choices. More broadly, they contribute to a large literature on the determinants of self-employment and provide evidence that social insurance encourages economic risk-taking like entrepreneurship. The final section presents a conclusion.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Despite a strong interest in the distribution and determinants of self-employment, economists have devoted relatively little attention to the role health insurance availability plays in self-employment decisions. Indeed, there is only one published study on the topic.
1 This lack of attention is especially surprising in the context of several studies on the influence of health insurance availability on job mobility. In the remainder of this section, I first briefly review why health insurance might influence labor market choices, including self-employment, in the U.S.
context. Next, I discuss why the IHCP might have affected self-employment decisions, focusing on its most relevant features and providing examples of groups for whom the IHCP likely represented a valuable source of alternative coverage not linked to traditional employment.
1 Holtz-Eakin, Penrod, and Rosen (1996) examine the impact of health insurance on the transition from traditional employment to self-employment using panel data. In particular, they compare the characteristics of individuals who transition from traditional to self-employment with their counterparts who remained wage earners and conclude that health insurance portability had no systematic effect on this transition.
Why Might Health Insurance Availability Affect Labor Market Choices?
As is well known, a majority of working-aged Americans obtain health insurance coverage as a fringe benefit offered by their employers (Fronstin 2004) . Conditional on working for an employer that offers health insurance, it is generally thought that individual coverage is more difficult to obtain and more expensive than equivalent group coverage, due in large part to adverse selection.
2 For example, potential adverse selection leads insurers in the individual market to engage in medical underwriting, a process by which they attempt to gather information on the "riskiness" of applicants. Based on such information, insurers may attach riders or other exclusions on existing conditions, rate an applicant as "substandard," which results in higher premiums, or deny coverage outright. 3 Since individuals who leave jobs with employersponsored coverage must eventually forfeit it, the higher costs associated with individual policies, coupled with potential difficulty in obtaining or maintaining coverage, may discourage job mobility (see, for example, Buchmueller and Valletta 1996; Cooper and Monheit 1993; Gruber and Madrian 1994; Madrian 1994b) . Such immobility may be especially binding for individuals who face relatively high experience-rated premiums in the nongroup market (e.g., individuals healthy enough to work but considered "bad risks" by health insurers) and individuals who lack existing alternative sources of coverage (e.g., unmarried individuals, those ineligible for government-sponsored health insurance, etc.). Finally, note that certain individuals, like those with long-term chronic health problems or those who anticipate poor 2 Here, I refer to the "loading factor" or portion of the premium beyond expected loss, which is commonly considered the price of health insurance. Relative to group coverage, the loading factor for individual health insurance is much higher, on average (Phelps 1997) .
3 While there is agreement that such actions occur, there is less agreement over their prevalence in the nongroup market (see, for example, GAO 1996 GAO , 2002 Pauly and Nichols 2002; Pollitz et al., 2001 Beyond expanding the size of the market, the IHCP contained provisions aimed at increasing access for persons with poorer health and for whom affordability of health insurance was a binding constraint. For example, the IHCP limited exclusion from coverage on the ba of preexisting conditions to 12 months. Moreover, after 12 months with an IHCP plan, th waiting period was waived if an individual desired to change companies. Perhaps more importantly, the IHCP imposed pure community rating on premiums, so that all individuals 7 The possibility that individuals who would like to be self-employed but remain in traditional employment due to uncertainties with the individual market seems especially relevant because consumer information on the individual health insurance market is not particularly good. For example, Pollitz, Sorian, and Thomas (2001) find that different carriers in the same market treated identical fictitious applications quite differently. In such an environment, perceptions of difficulty in obtaining or maintaining coverage are likely relevant. market behavior, it also may have reduced the information costs associated with the purchase of purchasing a given plan from a given carrier would pay the same rate. Indeed, this differentiate the IHCP from other large state reforms that implemented weaker forms of community rating.
To mitigate the possibility of losses due to adverse selection, the IHCP transferred pricing power to insurance carriers, who no longer had to obtain approval from the state to increase premiums as was previously the case.
8 Nevertheless, these aspects of IHCP have strong implications for whose labor market b ent section.
To deal with the potential of increased enrollment, the IHCP encouraged entry into the individual market by requiring that all carriers selling health insurance policies in New Jerse either offer individual policies or, alternatively, subsidize the losses of those firms that sold them. This provision was intended to increase the number of potentially competing firms in the individual market. 9 As documented by Swartz and Garnick (1999) The IHCP also sought to induce competition by providing for portability of coverage between plans offered by different carriers within the system. The intention was that consumer search and potential subsequent mobility would discipline premiums. While plausible, it also seems likely that this provision would be viewed favorably by individuals whose next-best alternative is employer-sponsored coverage, since they would not be tied exclusively to any individual carrier.
Impact of the IHCP on New Jersey's Individual Health Insurance Market
While the policy itself is quite involved, the relevant question for my analysis is whether the IHCP succeeded in establishing individual coverage as a legitimate alternative to employersponsored coverage. More generally, did it effectively loosen the connection between traditional employment and access to health insurance? Relative to the prior regime, where nearly all individual insurance policies were sold by Blue Cross Blue Shield, the answer appears to be yes, at least in the short run. For example, as noted by Swartz and Garnick (2000) , the number of insurance companies selling policies in New Jersey's individual market increased from effectively one, prior to IHCP, to a maximum of 28 carriers. Beyond numbers, it is clear that the choices available to consumers in the individual market increased after August 1993. As mentioned, the IHCP created six standardized plans that involve different levels of 11 Many believe that niche markets reduce competition in individual insurance markets since they are tailored for very small groups and hence not available more generally. 12 There is evidence that standardization of plan offerings improved the functioning of the Medigap market (see, for example, Rice, Graham, and Fox 1997). comprehensiveness of coverage. Of the 17 firms that were selling policies in 1999, 12 sold one of the five indemnity plans and 9 sold the proscribed HMO coverage with some firms offering both types of coverage. This differed substantially from the prior regime where Blue Cross Blue Shield offered only indemnity coverage and individual policy choices were not uniform across individuals (e.g., smokers were offered different policies than nonsmokers).
Another important question is what happened to premiums following the IHCP. During its first two years, premiums fell from levels for comparable policies that were sold prior to the reform (Swartz and Garnick 2000) . While the hope was that competition in the individual market would continue to reduce premiums over time, there is evidence that they increased modestly over the next two years for some plans and by greater amounts for others. For example, from Q1:1995 to Q4:1996, the lowest real premium for Plan C, an intermediate level of indemnity coverage, and the HMO coverage option increased, respectively, from $127 to $146 per month and from $177 to $183 per month for individual coverage. By contrast, the price of Plan D, which represented the most generous plan offered through the IHCP, increased from $142 to $194 per month for individual coverage over this period. While the latter increase in premiums represents an increase of roughly one-third, it is important to note that these minimum prices were not much greater than average premiums offered via group insurance to employers in the U.S. Northeast.
13 That said, it is possible that some individuals, including already selfemployed individuals in "one-life" policies, faced higher premiums because the proscribed IHCP plans that replaced them involved higher levels of coverage and were not allowed to experiencerate premiums. While no data are available, it is thought that these plans were a small portion of New Jersey's individual health insurance market (Swartz and Garnick 1999) .
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Finally, while total enrollment increased dramatically from roughly 50,000 to over 180,000 in the first two years, it declined in the following years. 14 By Q4:1996, total enrollment was down to about 160,000. Even larger decreases occurred from Q1:1997 to Q4:2001, with total enrollment falling by roughly half. These declining enrollments suggest that the IHCP has been subject to adverse selection. Indeed, Monheit et al. (2004) For my purposes, adverse selection is not a large concern. First, even if adverse selection exists, the individuals responsible for it may be those induced into self-employment by the reform. In other words, any adverse selection may be driven, at least in part, by the behavior I intend to estimate. 15 Since the IHCP imposed pure community rating, one might expect larger behavioral responses among those who would likely have paid higher premiums in the effectively experience-rated individual market that prevailed prior to 1993. As will be seen, I
allow the impact of the reform to vary by smoking status, weight-related health, and age as proxies for observable health status. Second, the enrollment declines and larger premium increases that suggest the existence of adverse selection appear to have not started until after the 19 Though not as directly health related as smoking behavior and obesity status, I also estimate models by age group. In particular, I allow the impact of the IHCP on self-employment to vary across younger and older individuals since age is correlated with health status and since older individuals often have more difficulty obtaining and/or pay higher premiums for coverage in the individual market. 13 design. Another important advantage is that the BRFSS collects data on health status and health behaviors, unlike traditional sources of employment-related information. For reasons discussed in the previous section, health-related information is desirable since the alternative source of coverage provided by the IHCP may be relatively more valuable to observably less-healthy individuals, due to prior barriers in obtaining coverage in the individual market. In what follows, I compare the self-employment information in the BRFSS to corresponding information from a more commonly used source of employment-related information. Finally, I describe my analysis sample.
Self-Employment Status
As noted, the BRFSS is not a traditional source for employment-related data. So, while respondents are asked about their employment status, the relevant question is very general in nature. In particular, there are eight legitimate responses, including employed for wages, out of work for more than one year, out of work for less than one year, homemaker, student, retired, unable to work, and, of course, self-employed. Moreover, there is no information on multiple jobs and no information on intensity of work effort (e.g., hours worked per week). Despite this generality, the proportion reporting self-employment in the BRFSS is quite similar to estimates from a more traditional source of employment-related information. Table 1 The first column of Table 1 compares self-employment among individuals aged 25-59, which matches the sample I analyze. Corresponding estimates are quite similar (10.2 percent in BRFSS and 9.6 percent in the CPS), and this similarity extends across the age distribution with differences converging to equality with age. While the differences are small, the fraction that is self-employed is consistently lower in the CPS. This is likely due to the additional level of detail in the wording of the relevant CPS question, which asks respondents about the status of their main job held in the previous week. 20 As can be seen, these patterns hold for men and women.
The repeated cross-sectional nature of my data imply that I cannot model specific transitions to self-employment (e.g., from traditional employment to self-employment). 21 As a result, I cannot pinpoint the source of any policy effect that might be found. This limitation aside, I avoid two common issues that arise in using panel data. First, relatively infrequent labor market transitions are likely subject to nontrivial measurement error. Second, my estimates are not subject to bias from differential sample attrition. This latter point is especially relevant since recent work finds that displaced workers are more likely to transition to self-employment than their nondisplaced counterparts (Krashinsky 2004) . Perhaps more importantly, this finding suggests that focusing only on the transition from traditional to self-employment will miss much relevant behavior. 22 For example, displaced workers may be less likely to transition back to traditional employment after implementation of a policy similar to the IHCP.
Analysis Samples
The 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Given the nature of the policy change, I employ a difference-in-differences strategy. In principle, one could compare the fraction that is self-employed in New Jersey before and after the IHCP. However, this information alone may be biased due to secular trends in selfemployment or potential confounders such as changing economic conditions. As a result, a plausible comparison group is needed. As noted, I use four distinct sets of comparison states, including the nearby state of Pennsylvania as well as mid-Atlantic, Northeast, and all U.S. states that did not substantially reform their individual health insurance markets over the period in question. 23 In effect, I compare the before-after change in self-employment in New Jersey to the same measure for these four comparison groups. A standard regression-based implementation of this approach is as follows:
(1) * = α + ρ + η + γ + β + τ + ε 
ESTIMATES
In what follows, I first present self-employment means for New Jersey and four comparison groups for periods before and after implementation of the IHCP. I then present regression-based estimates from models that compare the New Jersey experience to those of the four sets of comparison states. After demonstrating the robustness of my estimates to the length of the postpolicy period, I estimate models that exploit within-state control groups that, in principle, should be more impacted by the reforms inherent in the IHCP. In particular, I allow the impact of the IHCP on self-employment decisions to vary by marital status, age and observable health status, where I proxy the latter by smoking behavior and obesity status. As seen in Table 3 , the fraction of New Jersey residents who report being self-employed prior to the IHCP is somewhat lower than in the four sets of comparison states. However, while this fraction remains virtually constant over time in the comparison states, it rises considerably for the New Jersey sample. 28 In particular, the fraction self-employed in New Jersey increases from 0.0798 to 0.0960. The implied difference-in-differences estimates are remarkably consistent across comparison groups and range from 0.0133 to 0.0161. In large part, this is due to the fact that there is virtually no change in self-employment in the four sets of comparison states over this period. The implication is that the fraction self-employed in New Jersey rose by between 1.3 and 1.6 percentage points as a result of the alternative source of health insurance 27 I include New Hampshire and Massachusetts in the Northeast and All U.S. states groups since each implemented similar reforms, but not until 1995 and 1996, respectively. Likewise, I include Kentucky and Washington in the All U.S. states group because each also implemented similar reforms, but not until 1996. Models that exclude these states produce estimates that are nearly identical in magnitude and precision to those presented below. 28 As shown later, the increase is driven by individuals for whom the reform was likely more meaningful than others (e.g., those without a potential alternative source of health insurance coverage and observably lesshealthy individuals).
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coverage provided by the implementation of the IHCP. Next, I investigate whether these preliminary estimates obtain in a regression-based context. Table 4 presents my main estimates. In particular, it reports estimates of γ in a regression-based difference-in-differences specification that compares the New Jersey experience to the experiences of the four sets of comparison states. As discussed, all individual comparison states experienced no substantial health insurance reforms over the period in question. The columns in Table 4 present estimates of Equation (1) that correspond to the four sets of comparison states. In particular, the estimates imply that the IHCP increased the fraction self-employed in New Jersey by between 1.1 and 1.6 percentage points-very similar to conditional mean estimates from Table 3. Relative to an initial level of self-employment of nearly 8 percent, these estimates represent an increase of between 14 and 20 percent. Table 5 reports estimates from models that vary the length of the postpolicy period for the comparison group labeled All U.S. states. The first column of Table 5 presents estimates from a model that shortens the length of this period to the end of 1995, and the remaining columns sequentially lengthen it by one year until the end of 2000. While estimates of γ decline somewhat with additional postpolicy years, they remain practically and statistically significant.
Regression-Based Estimates
For example, defining the postpolicy period from September 1993 to December 2000 implies an 11 percent increase in self-employment, which is about 60 percent as large as the corresponding estimate for All U.S. states presented in Table 4 . Though not presented, similar estimates using Pennsylvania, Mid-Atlantic states, and Northeast States as the relevant comparison groups show a similar pattern, but are somewhat more constant over time.
Important Heterogeneity in Main Estimates
As discussed, particular subgroups should be more likely to respond behaviorally to the IHCP. In particular, I posit that unmarried individuals and observably less-healthy individuals should value the alternative source of coverage provided by the IHCP to a greater extent than their married and healthier counterparts, respectively. With respect to marital status, unmarried individuals are less likely to have an existing alternative source of health insurance because they have no spouse. With respect to health status, it is likely that observably less-healthy individuals faced, or otherwise perceived, greater barriers in obtaining health insurance coverage in the individual market. As a result, the nature of the IHCP reforms, which included guaranteed insurability and renewability in the context of pure community rating of premiums and restrictions on preexisting conditions exclusions, suggests that less-healthy individuals should value the IHCP to a greater extent than their healthier counterparts. Table 4 . Relevant coefficient estimates are uniformly larger for unmarried individuals than their married counterparts, which is consistent with the notion that the IHCP was more valuable as an alternative source of coverage to individuals who did not have one available via a spouse. 29 Empirically, this result is consistent in magnitude and precision across all three comparison groups. There is also evidence that the IHCP increased self-employment among married New Jersey residents. For example, the Mid-Atlantic and All U.S. states specifications provide statistically precise evidence that implementation of the IHCP increased the fraction selfemployed among married individuals, though each effect is much smaller in magnitude relative 29 The finding is also similar in spirit to Madrian (1994b) , who finds that individuals with spousal health insurance are more likely to change jobs than those without it.
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to the corresponding estimate for unmarrieds. While not precisely estimated, coefficient estimates in the other two married specifications indicate similar implied magnitudes. Table 7 displays estimates by smoking status for my four comparison groups. For each group, the first column represents nonsmokers while the second column represents smokers. I label someone as a smoker if they smoke at least one-half pack of cigarettes per day (i.e., 10 cigarettes).
30 I make this restriction since health status differences must be plausibly observable, and while it is likely that light smoking could be hidden from a potential insurer, it seems unlikely that this level of daily smoking could be concealed systematically. The estimates in Table 7 suggest that the effect of the IHCP on self-employment decisions is much more pronounced for individuals who smoke at least one-half pack of cigarettes per day. Moreover, estimates of γ for these smokers are nearly identical across the four comparison groups. In addition, there is consistent evidence of an impact for nonsmokers, as defined, but the implied magnitudes are smaller than for smokers. These estimates, which suggest that the behavioral responses of smokers who cannot easily conceal their habit were larger than those of their nonsmoking counterparts, are consistent with the notion that the IHCP provided a more valuable alternative source of coverage to a set of individuals relatively more likely to have difficulty obtaining such coverage prereform.
31 Table 8 presents estimates by obesity status. Again, estimates from models with alternative comparison groups are presented. Each of the first columns represents nonobese individuals and each of the second columns represents obese individuals. I label someone as obese if they report weight and height such that their implied body mass index is greater than or 30 As a result, non-smokers include individuals who do not smoke as well as those who smoke less than 10 cigarettes per day. 31 Though not reported, this set of estimates is not very sensitive to the definition of a smoker. 22 equal to 28. While the clinical definition of adult obesity is a BMI of at least 30, it is well documented that individuals systematically underreport their weight when it is self-reported, as in the BRFSS, rather than explicitly measured (Cawley 1999) . Indeed, my own calculations using anthropometric data on height and weight from the third National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES III)-which was gathered from 1988 to 1994, a period only slightly earlier than mine-suggest that nearly 23 percent of individuals are measured to be clinically obese. In my BRFSS samples, roughly the same proportion report an implied BMI of 28 or higher, consistent with individuals underreporting their weight. 32 Using this definition, estimates in Table 8 suggest that while the IHCP had a systematic effect on nonobese individuals, the magnitude of its impact was much greater for individuals defined as obese. As with estimates by smoking status, these are consistent with the notion that the IHCP, as a source of alternative health insurance coverage, was more valuable to individuals who may have had a more difficult time obtaining insurance in the individual market prior to its implementation.
Though not reported, I find a similar pattern for overweight versus nonoverweight individuals where overweight status is attained with a BMI of at least 25.
Finally, though not as directly health related as smoking behavior or obesity status, I
estimate the impact of the IHCP on self-employment by age. In particular, I allow its impact to vary across two age groups-one composed of individuals less than 50 years old and the other including those at least 50 years old. As seen in Table 9 , whose structure mirrors Tables 6-8, corresponding estimates of γ are consistently larger for older individuals, though there is some systematic evidence of a relationship, albeit a smaller one, for those under 50 years old in the 23 Mid-Atlantic, Northeast, and All U.S. states comparison groups. Since age is correlated with health status, and since older individuals often have more difficulty or pay substantially higher premiums for individual health insurance, these estimates provide further evidence that increased health insurance availability, via the IHCP, increased self-employment in New Jersey. 
CONCLUSIONS
